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Abstract: This paper investigates Victorian investor financial portfolio 
strategies in England and Wales during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. We find that investors held on average about half of their gross wealth 
in the form of 4 or 5 liquid financial securities, but were reluctant to adopt fully 
contemporary financial advice to invest equal amounts in securities or to 
spread risk across the globe. They generally held under-diversified portfolios 
and proximity to their investments may have been an alternative to 
diversification as a means of risk reduction, especially for the less wealthy. 
 
Keywords: Diversification, portfolio theory, portfolio characteristics, portfolio risk. 
JEL Classifications: N23, N83, G11, G15. 
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Introduction 
 
Investors diversified their portfolios long before the advent of modern portfolio theory 
(MPT) in the mid-twentieth century. For the UK, there is a consensus in the literature 
that “the practice of spreading capital among numerous investments was being 
adopted” at least from the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Cheffins 2010, p. 
127; Foreman-Peck and Hannah 2011, p. 1222, Kennedy 1987, p. 145), with studies 
even investigating diversification as early as in the aftermath of the Glorious 
Revolution in the late seventeenth century (Carlos et al. 2015). The diversification 
principle is quite simple in its naïve version – put equal amounts in a number of 
different securities − and its adoption by active investors could thus seem a “natural 
and inevitable” result (Cole 1935, p. 58). Pre-MPT approaches to diversification, 
often framing themselves as “scientific investment” (Jefferys 1977, p. 416) or 
investment as an “exact science” (Lowenfeld 1907) put forward a more sophisticated 
set of investment rules. By World War I, investors were applying the concept, if not 
the mathematics, of correlation, and the recommendations made by contemporary 
advisers were consistent with the recommendations of MPT with respect to portfolio 
selection strategies (see also Rutterford and Sotiropoulos 2016). 
 To date, there has been very limited empirical research into how UK investors 
attempted portfolio diversification before MPT. Most discussions go no further than 
simply acknowledging the existence of portfolio diversification by UK investors from 
the late nineteenth century onwards.1 Research has been hampered by the lack of data 
at the micro level, still a critical issue for any study of contemporary financial 
transactions.  
 A limited number of studies offer some evidence from early stock exchange 
security transactions and related asset holdings (portfolios), but without explicitly 
discussing diversification. For example, Earle has studied the portfolio holdings of 
375 middle-class individuals who died between 1665 and 1720 and emphasizes the 
rising share of investment in government debt and corporate securities during the so-
called Financial Revolution of the late seventeenth century (Earle 1989, p. 146). 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Cheffins (2010) and Rutterford and Sotiropoulos (2016). 
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Based on death duty records between 1870 and 1902, Green et al. investigated the 
composition of wealth by age and gender stressing that shares became more important 
over the life course for both men and women (Green et al. 2009). Rutterford et al., 
looking at 223 share records of 47 companies registered in England and Wales over 
the period 1870 to 1935, captured the gradual rise of share ownership of male and 
female investors (Rutterford et al. 2011). 
 Early portfolio diversification is explicitly discussed only by Carlos et al. 
(2015) and Kennedy and Britton (1985). Carlos et al. compiled a dataset of share 
ownership for those joint-stock companies whose security prices were listed in the 
commercial newspaper, the Course of the Exchange.2 On the basis of their sample, 
Carlos et al. examined individual portfolio holdings in the 1690s as well as between 
1718 and 1723. They found that about 80% of active investors in these equities held 
shares in just one company: a sign of poor diversification (Carlos et al. 2015, p. 1). 
Kennedy and Britton (1985) is probably the only existing study explicitly looking at 
Victorian portfolios in Scotland. They examined a sample of 477 financial portfolios 
from probate records between 1876 and 1913, comparing them with the efficient 
frontier (for which they used sectoral economic outputs instead of financial returns). 
Their discussion does not extend beyond the fact that Scottish individual investors 
held sub-optimal portfolios; a finding that tallies nicely with Kennedy's argument that 
biases in Victorian capital markets and poor diversification opportunities hindered 
financial investment from reaching risky yet dynamic economic sectors (Kennedy and 
Britton 1986, p. 72; Kennedy 1987, p. 144). 
 Perhaps due to a lack of historical information on individual investment 
decisions at the micro level, systematic empirical research on portfolio holdings 
appeared only after the 1970s (in other words, after the formulation of MPT and of a 
special case of MPT, the Capital Asset Pricing Model or CAPM).3 Blume and Friend 
                                                          
2 This is a rather small sample of eight companies that also does not cover all opportunities available to 
investors at the time, such as home and overseas government bonds, local utility securities, and unlisted 
shares in joint-stock firms or the businesses of friends and family. 
3 The MPT is generally associated with Markowitz (1952). The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
mostly associated with the names of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), was the ‘logical’ next step. It 
approached the risk of an individual asset through the lens of diversification theory. The risk of every 
financial security comprises two components: systematic risk and unsystematic risk. The unsystematic 
risk element is idiosyncratic and can be reduced through diversification. The systematic risk element is 
related to market variation as a whole and cannot be diversified away. Thus, it is only the systematic 
5 
 
(1975), using US survey data for 1962 and income tax records for 1971, showed that a 
large number of households held poorly diversified equity portfolios (see also Blume 
et al. 1974). Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), using 1990s discount brokerage data, 
found evidence of under-diversified equity portfolios (especially among younger, 
low-income, less-educated and less-sophisticated investors). Other research based on 
surveys of consumer finances also reports weak diversification among households in 
the 2000s (Polkovnichenko 2005; Kelly 1995). 
 Apart from Kennedy and Britton (1985), there are to our knowledge no other 
studies which use financial portfolio data to explicitly discuss diversification in the 
late nineteenth century. This period is particularly important. Given the global 
distribution of capital, diversification was being widely recommended by financial 
analysts at the time. Also, during this period, international diversification could be 
achieved with low currency risk given the gold standard regime. In addition, there 
was an increasing number of limited liability companies in the wake of the 1856 and 
1862 Companies Acts, and a growing number of types of domestic and international 
securities (ordinary shares, preferred shares and fixed interest securities) and sectors 
listed on both the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and on provincial stock exchanges. 
 A few studies emphasize the importance of portfolio diversification in the late 
nineteenth century in the context of financial developments. They attempt to explain 
some stylized facts in UK financial history on the basis of modern portfolio theory, 
such as the preference for non-domestic stocks4 (major outflows of capital from the 
UK) or the preference for railway stocks (Mitchell et al. 2012), relying on market 
returns and sectoral indices, not on actual individual holdings, to argue in a 
hypothetical fashion that diversification would have had gains had investors chosen to 
diversify. Edelstein (1982), for instance, found that foreign holdings earned on 
average 1.58% risk-adjusted return per annum more than domestic holdings (using an 
international CAPM model over the period 1870 to 1913). Goetzmann and Ukhov, 
extending Edelstein’s analysis, considered whether investors during this period may 
have instinctively taken account of the historic correlations (for the period 1870 to 
                                                          
risk which is relevant in determining the return. There is no premium for bearing risks that can be 
eliminated through diversification. 
4 See Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006), Chabot and Kurz (2010), and Edlinger et al. (2013). Edelstein’s 
(1982) intervention pioneered this line of thought. 
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1913) between different asset classes when choosing their portfolio asset allocation. 
They argue that the optimal percentage of overseas securities for investors to have 
held before the outbreak of World War I was not far from the actual proportion of all 
foreign securities listed on the LSE in nominal terms (see Goetzmann and Ukhov 
2006).5 
 Following Goetzmann and Ukhov, Edlinger et al. (2013) argue that, for French 
investors, a preference for European investment would have been in line with optimal 
portfolio analysis, and that late nineteenth century investors’ disregard of European 
securities in favour of other foreign investments was suboptimal in terms of the risk-
return trade off. Chabot and Kurz (2010) reach a similar conclusion to that of 
Goetzmann and Ukhov. Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts (2012) identify the optimal 
portfolio percentages, not for international investments, but for British railways, 
which investors should have held in the decades up to World War I. 
 None of the above research had access to individual investor portfolios with 
which to confirm their macro level results. In contrast, this study draws upon a sample 
of portfolio holdings carefully reconstructed from existing probate records from 1870 
to 1902. This is the first study to investigate the diversification of actual investor 
portfolios during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 
 
The geographic distribution of risk: Naive diversification from the 1870s 
 
Investors are generally assumed to be risk averse; maximizing their expected 
investment return (generally agreed to be the total of income and capital gain over a 
particular period) for a given level of risk. Alternatively, they are assumed to be 
satisfied with the least possible risk relative to the return they seek. The measure most 
                                                          
5 Linking optimal diversification across asset classes to the actual distribution of London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) officially listed securities is an important contribution to the literature. However, one 
should be very cautious in the interpretation of the results. Portfolio optimization is highly sensitive to 
how many asset classes are included in the sample and to the time span used to calculate the average 
returns, risks and covariances (Black and Litterman 1992, p. 28). There was also significant foreign 
ownership in some LSE-listed securities with some loans issued in a number of countries (see Platt 
1986, p. 32, p.36). Finally, to have a complete picture of whether UK capital exports were optimal, we 
would also need to take into consideration the provincial stock exchanges along with LSE's junior 
unofficial market (Thomas 1973, Platt 1986, Hannah 2015). 
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commonly used to quantify risk is the standard deviation of returns. Markowitz 
(1952) developed a formal model of portfolio selection, combining the statistical 
definition of risk with a risk-averse assumption of investor behavior. This application 
of a mean-variance model to the portfolio selection problem laid the ground for 
modern portfolio theory, triggering, inspiring and influencing a vast amount of 
research in finance. The main insight is simple: when it comes to the analysis of 
portfolio risk, one needs to take into account not only the individual components’ 
risks but also their interactions. Markowitz’s mean-variance model was designed for a 
single period. Subsequent research has attempted to generalize the single period 
model to a multi-period one under various assumptions about investor utility 
functions and dependency of returns between periods (Elton and Gruber 1997). 
 Investors were not helpless nor did they lack investment advice before the 
formulation of MPT.6 The investment approach of spreading risk across a number of 
securities was widely promoted in investment publications from the 1870s. In these 
publications, financial advisers and analysts offered detailed recommendations on 
how to combine different investments in a portfolio. These recommendations 
increased in sophistication over time. By 1914 only the mathematical optimization of 
Markowitz’ model was lacking in terms of portfolio best practice in the UK. 
 Indeed, from the early 1870s, a number of pamphlets and articles advised 
investors to add to their portfolios as many risky securities, in equal weights, as were 
required to generate a targeted yield. According to contemporary financial 
terminology, this strategy is known as naïve diversification.7 For example, after 
acknowledging the British investor’s preference for none but British government 
securities, Chadwicks’ Investment Circular in 1870 argued:8 
                                                          
6 For an extensive analysis of this point see Rutterford and Sotiropoulos (2016). 
7 Recent empirical research offers evidence that naïve diversification, or alternatively the so-called 1/N 
rule of portfolio weights (N is the number of different securities), out-performs optimal portfolio 
strategies. Due to the complexity of financial markets, it seems that the gain from optimal 
diversification is more than offset by investor estimation errors (DeMiguel 2009). Thus, it appears that 
recommending a strategy of naïve diversification was a relatively sophisticated approach to improving 
the return risk trade-off. 
8 Chadwicks, Adamson, Collier & Co. (Chadwicks) was a firm of accountants based in Manchester, but 
also with offices in London (see Thomas 1973, pp. 66, 123). In the 1870s they specialized in issuing 
prospectuses on a series of firms from different industries. Chadwicks’ Investment Circular was issued 
monthly, from 1870 to 1875. They started the journal using their existing client base (of 5,000 
investors). There is no doubt that the above-mentioned ideas of diversification reached a wide audience 
of financial investors, with possible significant impact. 
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We are now too much alive to our own interests to place our trust in Consols alone [...]. 
Moreover, Railways, and even Foreign Stocks, have been found to pay better in the long 
run. We hold that, by a careful selection from the various media of investment, very 
remunerative returns in the shape of interest may be obtained; while, by a proper division 
of risks, not only may the security for the principal be rendered perfectly satisfactory, but 
there may be a good prospect that the invested capital will steadily increase in value.9 
 
The authors of Chadwicks’ Investment Circular also provided empirical examples of 
how such “proper division” of risks worldwide might work in practice, preferring 
portfolios of five securities of different types (such as home railways and foreign 
stocks) to be held in equal amounts by market value, and chosen to target a particular 
yield for the portfolio.10 Similar advice was offered in Beeton’s Guide to Investing 
Money with Safety and Profit, published in 1870.11 Investment books, magazines, 
pamphlets and newspaper articles made investors systematically aware of the benefits 
of spreading risks at home and abroad through naive diversification: add as many 
risky securities, in equal weights, as required to generate a targeted yield with an 
emphasis of spreading portfolios overseas.12 Several investment trust prospectuses 
also promoted the idea of international diversification during the same period. 
 
 
The Geographic Distribution of risks: Scientific investment in the early 1900s 
 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, a more sophisticated top-down 
approach13 to portfolio diversification was gradually developed by investment 
advisers such as Henry Lowenfeld. The focus was now explicitly on the idea of 
correlation and on reducing portfolio risk by proper selection of uncorrelated but 
                                                          
9 Chadwicks' Investment Circular 1870, pp. 30-1. 
10 Chadwicks’ Investment Circular 1870, p.32. 
11 Beeton’s Guide to Investing allowed choice from a wide range of countries and types of security and 
suggested portfolios of from three to five securities, not all equally weighted (Beeton 1870, pp. 26, 54). 
12 Rutterford and Sotiropoulos (2016). 
13 A ‘top down’ investment strategy starts with the opportunity set of investable securities, in this case 
global stock markets and, from this to select first the countries in which to invest, then the sectors, then 
individual securities. This is in contrast to a ‘bottom up’ approach which selects preferred individual 
securities without specifically trying to spread risk across countries or sectors. 
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equally volatile securities. This strategy continued with the concept of international 
diversification and further expanded and elaborated insights and techniques already in 
place by the 1870s. The key difference from naïve diversification, was that instead of 
selecting securities one by one, the “scientific approach” was to divide the world into 
regions and select one or more securities related to that region. This was also called 
“geographical distribution of capital.”  
 Geographical  diversification strategies were actively promoted by a number 
of contributors to the Financial Review of Reviews, a monthly magazine first 
published in 1905, and in textbooks such as Investment an Exact Science, by Henry 
Lowenfeld (1907), followed-up by others.14 Lowenfeld did not identify an efficient 
set of portfolios according to modern portfolio theory calculations, nonetheless he 
offered a sophisticated analytical framework for the main principles and building 
blocks of financial diversification. He explained in detail a top-down approach to 
portfolio construction: by targeting a particular level of yield at the portfolio level but 
also by reducing capital risk through the choice of relatively uncorrelated securities. 
Historical analysis of returns, price volatility and correlation were all taken into 
account in the portfolio selection. Lowenfeld was very influential; his diversification 
approach was translated into French and German as well as being promoted by 
others.15 
 The top-down approach concentrated on global diversification. The implicit 
but fundamental assumption was that the global financial market was fragmented and, 
thus, security prices and returns were “dominantly influenced by the trading 
conditions of the particular country in which they are principally held and dealt in” 
thus following that country’s business cycle (Lowenfeld 1907, p. 61; see also Crozier 
1910). Securities from the same (domestic) market were thought of as more likely to 
be positively correlated. While diversification was perceived as a “systematic method 
of averaging risks” (Lowenfeld 1907, p. 61; Hobson 1914, p. 234) or, alternatively, as 
                                                          
14 For an extensive discussion of these issues see Rutterford and Sotiropoulos (2016). 
15 His intervention became so popular that it was presented as such in 1914 to the French financial 
public by Francois Maury in a pamphlet entitled Le Placement Stable (Maury 1914a). Maury replicated 
and reproduced Lowenfeld’s main arguments and also offered investment advice. Maury’s journal, 
Finance-Univers, contained case studies of how to reorganise portfolios according to Lowenfeld’s 
method (Guebhard 1914). For other approaches to scientific investment, see Crozier (1910), May 
(1912) and Withers (1930). 
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a method to neutralize and balance risks against each other (Crozier 1910), in practice 
it became a method of “geographical distribution of capital.” International 
diversification was thought to offer more beneficial covariances than domestic 
diversification as it allowed investors to “obtain as great a contrast as is possible in 
the trade influences which govern each one of his holdings” (Crozier 1910, p. 90). 
 
 
The Data 
 
Data on individual portfolios are hard to obtain and scarce even in contemporary 
research on financial transactions. For the post-1960s period, there are a number of 
empirical studies of individual (or household) portfolios typically using relatively 
recent data from surveys, tax returns or brokerage accounts.16 We use probate records 
for the period 1870 to 1902. Probate records are records of wealth used for taxation on 
death. From 1796, legacy duty was levied on moveable property, and the surviving 
residuary accounts for the assessment of this tax that have survived provide detailed 
information on an individual’s personal wealth at death.17 The residuary account 
series in this paper contains information for a sample of 1,446 individuals who died in 
England and Wales between 1870 and 1902. Although only a small portion of the 
total actually submitted, the sample itself appears to be reasonably representative of 
the broader population from which it was drawn. A comparison of the number of 
accounts for each county with the total number of adult deaths in 1881 confirms that 
there is no geographical bias in the series (Rutterford et al. 2011, p. 177). The 
valuation of personal assets in the probate data was based on the market price that 
prevailed at the time of probate and is, therefore, an accurate measurement of worth. 
The data also refer to individuals who owned sufficient assets at the time of their 
death to warrant the submission of accounts for the assessment of death duties. Only 
those individuals who died leaving personal property worth at least £5, or £10 in 
                                                          
16 For a discussion on data collection methodologies see: Campbell (2006, pp. 1555/57) and Blume and 
Friend (1975). 
17 The methodology for extracting information from probate records is described by Green at al. (2009) 
and Green et al. (2011). Our analysis concentrates on the sub-sample of Green et al.’s sample of estates 
at death which included financial securities. 
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London, had to file for probate and even those with smaller estates were often exempt 
from paying death duties. Of the 1,446 individuals in the probate sample, only 507 
held financial securities of any type, and it is this sample of 507 that we use in our 
analysis. We should also bear in mind that any evidence derived from end of life data 
will have an inevitable age bias towards the elderly.18 
 Our sample offers good coverage not only of individual financial portfolios 
but also of all other assets and liabilities at death. For each individual, the dataset 
contains personal characteristics (age, gender, marital status, and address of 
residence), as well as gross wealth (gross estate). Gross wealth includes non-financial 
assets and financial securities. The financial securities were divided in the probate 
files into seven categories: canals, ships or shares of ships, railway shares, and ‘other 
shares’, as well as foreign, colonial and UK government stock. For each security 
listed, the probate archives reported the name and market value of the security, 
allowing us to estimate the number of holdings and value of each portfolio, as well as 
the sector and country to which each holding related. However, detailed information 
on security type for every non-government security is not always complete. Where 
details on the security type are missing, we can, in some cases, determine the exact 
security held, as, for example, when a firm only has ordinary shares as capital or 
where it states ‘debenture’ and there is only one type of debenture in the firm’s 
capital. However, this is not always possible. In practice, this means that we cannot 
use individual security returns and market prices for all securities to estimate overall 
portfolio performance. About one fourth of the total of 2,316 securities in the 
portfolios of our sample is unspecified with regard to security type (ordinary share, 
preferred share, debenture or loan stock); 221 from a total of 507 portfolios are 
affected by incomplete information as to security type. The larger portfolios of 
wealthy investors, with more holdings per portfolio, are more affected by missing 
information. As a result, the complete and incomplete portfolio subsamples do not 
mirror the full sample. 
                                                          
18 In the absence of systematic information about financial portfolios during earlier phases of the life 
course, we are forced to rely on this end of life evidence with which to draw conclusions in the 
following analysis. 
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 Table 1 gives some characteristics of our sample of investors who died 
between 1870 and 1902, in particular number of observations, age at death and, for 
women, marital status. To capture changes over the period, the data are also divided 
into four sub-periods of approximately equal duration: 1870-1878, 1879-1886, 1887-
1894, and 1895-1902. The sample of 507 investors is almost equally divided between 
male (263) and female (244), a finding that reinforces the (underestimated) 
importance of women investors in the Victorian era.19 As expected, single women 
(139) and widows (86) were more numerous than married women (16), comprising 
92% of the total number of women investors in the sample. Until the Married 
Women’s Property Acts (MWPA) of 1870 and 1882, a married woman’s legal 
identity was covered by her husband (coverture). Unmarried women (single and no-
longer married/widows) were legal individuals in their own right, not requiring, for 
example, a male signature for financial transactions. Women who married after the 
MWPAs were able to retain inheritances and hold shares in their own names.20 
However, given the age profile of the women in the sample, it is likely that most 
women of that age profile who did marry, did so before the MWPA of 1882, if not 
before that of 1870. 
The average age of death was 63 for men and 67 for women, with an overall 
average of 65. The average age at death for the sample rose throughout the period 
from 61 in the first sub-period to 67 in the last sub-period. On average, 67% of 
investors lived for more than 60 years. Most investors in the sample probably held 
securities for some time, gradually increasing their investments and/or the number of 
holdings in their portfolios. The implication for investment is that portfolios may have 
been held for some time before death.21 
 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
                                                          
19 See also Rutterford et al. (2006), Maltby and Rutterford (2006). 
20 The MWPA of 1870 did not allow married women to own real estate in their own name. Married 
women also required their husbands’ permission to own assets separately. It was not until the MWPA 
of 1882 that married women fully acquired the same rights as single women with respect to owning 
financial assets (Maltby and Rutterford 2006, pp. 115-116). 
21 As discussed in the multivariate regression analysis below, age does not seem to be a decisive factor 
for men with respect to diversification measures, whereas age is a factor for women. 
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 Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the basic asset categories of gross 
wealth for our investors. All reported asset categories show very high positive 
skewness, indicating significant wealth polarization amongst this sample of UK 
investors. The polarization is also evident in the differences between mean and 
median values. The market value of the average portfolio was £5,301 (£529,900 in 
2017) while the most valuable portfolio was worth £260,402 (c. £26 million in 
2017).22 This portfolio was held by Mr Joshua Milne Heap, who died in 1890 at the 
age of 65 and had 91 different stocks comprising mostly UK and non-UK railway 
securities. The value of this portfolio was high in relation to the rest of the sample. 
For instance, the third largest portfolio in value terms belonged to Mr Thomas 
Wainer, who died in 1883, and contained 18 securities worth £77,668 (including a 
range of different securities: Consols, gas, railways, insurance, canals and an 
investment trust). The largest female portfolio belonged to Mrs Mary Gould, a 
London widow who died in 1872, comprising 18 securities worth £63,596 and spread 
between Consols and different types of UK securities, including railways and canals. 
 
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
 On average, financial assets amounted to around 50% of total wealth but the 
range varies from almost zero to 100%. The median is higher than 50%, thus the 
majority of those individuals who chose to hold financial securities as part of their 
gross wealth invested more than 50% of their total gross wealth in such investments, 
with real estate the next most important asset. Liabilities23 represented a relatively 
small proportion of overall wealth. The majority of investors in our dataset had 
liabilities representing less than 10% of total gross wealth (the median was 1.5%). 
Thus, the difference between gross and net wealth was small for these late nineteenth 
century investors. 
 
                                                          
22 Female portfolios averaged £2,981 (£298,000 in 2017) and male portfolios averaged £7,442 
(£744,000 in 2017). For further information on gender differences in portfolio values, see Rutterford 
and Sotiropoulos (2016, p. 296). The 2017 values were calculated using real prices from 1886 (the 
median year of death of the sample) on measuringworth.com.  
23 For a definition of liabilities, see notes to Table 2. 
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Portfolio diversification 
 
In Table 3, we use two measures to examine the level of diversification of the 507 
portfolios in the sample. The simplest, and the most commonly used, measure of 
diversification is the number of holdings in a portfolio.24 The underlying assumption 
is that “the greater the number of issues, the greater the potential for diversification” 
(Blume et al. 1974, p. 31). Panel (a) of Table 3 shows that the average number of 
holdings is 4.56. Thus, the average individual UK investor in our sample held 
between 4 and 5 different securities. The difference between the mean and the median 
number of holdings indicates significant positive skewness, suggesting that the 
majority of investors had portfolios with fewer than 4 holdings. Indeed, the median 
number of holdings for the sample is 2. The relatively high standard deviation implies 
high dispersion in the number of holdings in individual portfolios. In our sample, the 
number of holdings varies between 1 and 91. These findings suggest that a large 
number of UK portfolios in the late nineteenth century were under-diversified. As we 
can see from panel (b) of Table 3, almost 40% of total portfolios included just one 
security, while almost 80% of portfolios − the great majority − included no more than 
5 securities. However, 11% of portfolios included more than 11 securities. 
 
[TABLE 3 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Panel (b) of Table 3 also reports portfolio holdings estimated by Carlos et al. 
(2015) for early 1690s and 1720s portfolios. Of course, our results are not directly 
comparable. Carlos et al. (2015) compile their portfolios from the shareholder records 
of the listed stock of only eight large joint stock firms and thus exclude other 
marketable financial securities of the time. Investment choices at that time were 
relatively limited by comparison with the late nineteenth century, when the nature of 
stock exchanges in the UK was very different, as were the diversification options 
available to ordinary investors.25 However, the proportion of investors in our sample 
                                                          
24 See for instance Blume and Friend (1975, p. 586); Goetzmann and Kumar (2008, p. 436). 
25 For instance, at the beginning of our sample (in 1870) there were 539 companies, with nominal 
capital of £36.9 million, registered under the Companies Act in England. By 1902, the number of 
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with just one holding remains quite high at 40% (as compared with 87% for Carlos et 
al.’s sample). Victorian portfolios were still under-diversified. 
 Table 3 lists the results of some post-1960 studies of US household and 
individual investor diversification. Although there are some caveats26 in comparing 
our sample with more recent US data, it is clear from Table 3 that under-
diversification remained an issue well into the late twentieth century. In fact, 
Victorian UK investors compare rather well with late twentieth-century investors in 
terms of diversification. According to Blume and Friend’s (1975) sample, US 
households’ average number of equity holdings in 1962 was just 3.41, while the 
median number of holdings was two. In a different sample from 1971 (Blume et al. 
1974, p. 37), the US average number of equity holdings was 4.5, higher than the 1962 
average for US households, but very similar to the average number of security 
holdings of UK investors almost a century earlier. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008, p. 
437) estimate that US retail brokerage clients between 1991 and 1996 held on average 
four equity securities. More recent surveys of the consumer finances of US 
households have estimated a median number of equity holdings of 2 until 2001, when 
it rose to 3 (Kelly 1995; Polkovnichenko 2005). Thus, UK investors in our sample 
engaged in more financial diversification than did their US counterparts after the 
1960s. Portfolios both now and then are on average under-diversified. Table 3 panel 
(b) shows that 78.5% of Victorian investors held no more than 5 securities in their 
portfolios. This is comparable to the corresponding 75.6% of US investors with no 
more than 5 holdings in 1991-96 and to the 71% of US households that held no more 
than 4 stocks in 1971. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
registered companies had increased to 3,596 with £147.6 million of nominal capital (Stock Exchange 
Official Intelligence, London, 1903). 
26 First, these post-1960s US studies are focused on equities and exclude fixed income securities. 
Victorian stock exchanges, however listed a considerable number of fixed income securities which 
were an important element of financial portfolios at the time. Second, according to our estimates, UK 
stock exchange investors in 1901 represented about 1.6% of the total population, with an equivalent 
figure of 15% for the US in the early 1970s, that is, roughly ten times bigger in relative terms 
(Rutterford and Sotiropoulos 2017, Table 2). 
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Portfolio concentration and under-diversification 
 
Counting the holdings in a portfolio as a measure of diversification gives equal 
importance to naively diversified (equally weighted) portfolios and to unbalanced 
portfolios. Thus we use a second measure of diversification. This is the sum of the 
squared portfolio weights, or SSPW, the values of which are shown in Table 3 for the 
various samples of investors. Following Blume et al. (1974), Blume and Friend 
(1975), and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), the SSPW is given by the following 
expression: 
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where N is the number of holdings in the portfolio, Nm is the number of securities in 
the market portfolio, wi is the portfolio weight assigned to security i in the portfolio, 
wm is the weight assigned to a security in the market portfolio (wm=1/Nm). SSPW thus 
captures the diversification level of a portfolio by its deviation from the market 
portfolio. Since the weight of each security in the overall market portfolio is very 
small, this diversification measure is in practice equal to the sum of the squared 
portfolio weights. SSPW identifies unbalanced portfolios, capturing the extent to 
which the value of a portfolio is concentrated in a few securities. For example, a 
portfolio invested equally in two securities would have an SSPW of 0.5, whereas an 
unbalanced one invested 90% and 10% in two securities would have an SSPW of 0.82. 
A portfolio following Lowenfeld’s recommendation for a global, top-down portfolio 
with ten equal investments, say, would have an SSPW of 0.10. Generally, the lower 
the SSPW measure, the greater the level of diversification and the closer to the type of 
naive portfolio diversification recommended by financial advice at that time. 
 The information in Table 3 allows us to compare the SSPW for investors with 
different numbers of holdings. The number of holdings is (negatively) related to 
SSPW values; for example, for portfolios containing more than 11 securities, the 
SSPW falls to 0.13, implying a good level of diversification, close to the SSPW for an 
equally weighted portfolio invested in 10 holdings which would have an SSPW of 
0.10. In contrast, an unbalanced portfolio of ten holdings, with, say, 5% invested in 
each of nine holdings and 55% in one holding would have an SSPW of 0.32. Our 
sample SSPW results of a mean of 0.66 and a median of 0.70 are also similar to the 
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results of more recent studies. They are slightly lower than the SSPW of 0.71 found by 
Blume and Friend (1975) for their 1962 US sample, although they are higher both 
than the Blume et al. (1974) SSPW estimate of 0.52 for the 1971 US sample and the 
Goetzmann and Kumar SSPW estimates for the mid-1990s, which range between 0.47 
and 0.56. 
 
[TABLE 4 NEAR HERE] 
 
Portfolio concentration is reported in Table 4. The average and the median value of 
the largest holding and the two largest holdings expressed as the ratio to total portfolio 
value are given for different deciles of the financial wealth distribution. These two 
measures capture how concentrated (unbalanced) were the portfolio weights in our 
sample. The higher the concentration of financial investment in one or two securities, 
the greater the difference from equal weights. Table 4 offers further evidence of the 
unbalanced structure of portfolios. It suggests that even wealthy investors were 
reluctant to equally weight their portfolios into different financial holdings. On 
average, investors in the top two deciles held portfolios with more than 10 securities 
but concentrated about 44% of their financial wealth in a single holding. At least 50% 
of the top two deciles of investors invested more than 32% of their portfolio value in 
one security. Investors in the two top deciles invested on average about 61% of their 
portfolios in two securities. The overall average weight of the largest holding was 
71.9% and the average sum of the two largest security weights was 85.3%. 
Investors appear to have been reluctant to adopt even the recommended naive 
diversification strategy, thereby exhibiting resistance to the 1/N rule. Nevertheless, 
our results compare with the findings of Blume and Friend for the 1962 sample of US 
households. In our sample, half of the investors invested more than 81% in a single 
security, relative to 90% estimated by Blume and Friend, and 100% in one or two 
securities, which was the same in the 1962 US sample (see the median figures in the 
last row of Table 4; Blume and Friend 1975, p. 589). So, Victorian investors were 
overall under-diversified but exhibited similar behavior to that of the US household 
sector in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
[TABLE 5 NEAR HERE] 
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 In Table 5 we focus on portfolios with just one or two holdings, representing 
about 60% of investors in our sample, almost equally distributed by gender. These are 
mostly less wealthy investors. Due to the extreme polarization of the wealth 
distribution, the average value of portfolios with one or two securities amounts to only 
one fifth of the average portfolio value for the whole sample and, thus, this under-
diversified 57.8% of investors represents only 11.6% of portfolio investment in total. 
The majority of this investment (83%) was domestic, with only 17% invested in 
overseas securities. This compares with 28% invested overseas by the investors as a 
whole. Half (50%) of portfolio wealth was invested in UK corporate securities other 
than railways, with a majority in the form of equity.27 The preference for UK non-
railway securities in under-diversified portfolios is striking. It may indicate some risk-
seeking behavior but perhaps also a preference for locally-listed UK firms. Such 
behavior was notably higher amongst male investors. Female investors preferred 
placing relatively more in government and railway securities. These findings run 
contrary to the argument that Victorian investors (as opposed to investment) were 
biased “towards safe, well-known securities in general, a great number of which were 
foreign, and away from riskier, smaller, but ultimately from an economy-wide 
viewpoint, much more profitable ones” (Kennedy 1987, p. 145). The relatively less 
wealthy majority of Victorian investors in our sample held under-diversified 
portfolios but also preferred less safe non-railway UK corporate securities.28 
 
 
Victorian portfolios across time: sectoral analysis 
 
Given that we have a spread of investor portfolios from 1870 to 1902, our sample 
allows us to explore variations over time in asset allocation and in portfolio choice. 
                                                          
27 Under-diversified portfolio holdings were split 44.0% corporate (Railways and Other) ordinary or 
preferred shares and 37.7% fixed interest corporate securities. The remaining 18.4% of corporate 
security holdings were unspecified. There were no unspecified securities in the government security 
category. 
28 Not all these securities in our dataset were listed. Some may have been issued by unquoted family 
companies. Geographical proximity engendered trust or informal networks, which may have provided 
an alternative risk reduction strategy to the more conventional spreading of risk across uncorrelated 
securities (see Rutterford et al. 2017). 
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Here we focus more on investors as a particular ‘sector’ in the UK economy and only 
marginally discuss intra-sectoral variation in financial behavior. In other words, our 
aim is to explain some general characteristic of Victorian investors as a body separate 
from other market participants such as banks and different types of institutional 
investors. 
In the first panel of Table 6 we trace diversification measures across four, 
eight-year sub-periods. We show that, from the late 1880s, there was a significant 
increase in the average number of securities held. From 3.2 for 1870-1878, the 
average number of holdings almost doubled to 5.8 by the turn of the century. It would 
appear that such diversification became more popular with the rising importance of 
stock markets (the so-called ‘equity culture’),29 as well as becoming more practicable 
with the increasing portfolio size (not reported in the table). Increasing diversification 
over time is also reflected in the figures for the median number of holdings (from 2 to 
4 over the period) and the average SSPW (from 0.74 to 0.57). The median number of 
holdings of the last two periods is greater than the median number of holdings of US 
households in the early 2000s.30 
 
[TABLE 6 NEAR HERE] 
 
 We now examine how investment in our sample was split internationally 
between different sector and regional asset categories over time. There are significant 
differences in the portfolio compositions, as is to be expected given the rapid changes 
in investment opportunities over the period 1870 to 1902. In the first sub-period, 
50.6% of the combined portfolios was invested in government bonds, compared with 
23.6% in railways. By the third sub-period, these numbers were reversed, with only 
14.3% in government securities and 55.0% in railways; with a second reversal in the 
fourth sub-period, when British railway securities fell in value, by more than half 
from 42.0% to 19.2% in our combined sample portfolios. Investment in foreign and 
colonial government securities was highest in the first sub-period, 1870-1878, 
                                                          
29 Michie 1987, Rutterford et al. 2011. 
30 Improvements in the diversification measures appear linked to the overall improvement in investor 
wealth (not reported in Table 6), as reflected by the increase in the median gross wealth and median 
financial wealth. See also the regression analysis below. 
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coinciding with a peak in 1872 of net annual outflows of British savings into foreign 
assets (Edelstein 1982, p. 29). There was another peak, less pronounced, in 1890 
(ibid.), reflected in Table 6 by the greater percentage investment in colonial 
government bonds and non-domestic railway securities for the last two sub-periods. 
The percentage invested in other corporate sectors was relatively steady during the 
whole period, ranging between 25.0% and 30.9%, despite the rapid growth in 
importance of these sectors over time. 
 For comparison, the importance of these categories on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) for the same sub-periods is also shown in Table 7. In other words, 
we follow Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) in comparing our portfolios with the actual 
distribution of LSE officially-listed securities.  This comparison allows us to explore 
to what extent investors as a whole in our sample chose to buy securities listed on the 
LSE in proportion to their importance. In our sample, the portfolio weights are based 
on market values, and investors do not necessarily hold only LSE officially-listed 
securities. In other words, the ‘market’ for our investors includes not only the LSE but 
also the provincial stock exchanges and the non-negligible LSE’s “junior market.”31 
To make a more meaningful comparison, we have used the Bankers’ Magazine (BM) 
market value indices, available after 1880, to translate LSE par values to market 
values.32 Table 7 reports LSE aggregate sectoral market value weights based on BM 
indices. Unfortunately, detailed data on paid-up capital of the provincial stock 
exchanges and the LSE unofficial list market do not exist, so we must be cautious 
when comparing Tables 6 and 7. As a general rule, however, we know that the LSE 
was dominated by government and railway securities, while provincial stock 
exchanges and the LSE’s junior market placed relatively more emphasis on local 
domestic companies (Thomas 1973, p. 114; Hannah 2015). Given that the investors in 
our sample did not limit their choices to LSE-listed securities, we would expect their 
portfolios to be more domestic-biased than aggregate LSE figures. 
 
[TABLE 7 NEAR HERE] 
 
                                                          
31 See Hannah (2015, pp. 25-8). 
32 For more information on the BM indices see the note to online Appendix Table A2. 
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As revealed by the BM indices (see online Appendix Table A2), government 
bonds were traded on average around par for the whole period. Foreign government 
bonds’ market value consistently averaged around 15% below par. UK railway 
securities remained on average 30% above par, whilst foreign and colonial railway 
securities traded below par. Market values for the securities in the remaining sectors 
hovered generally somewhat above their par values for the whole period under 
consideration. Finance security market values, however, exceeded three times their 
par values. Given that government and railway securities dominated the LSE up to 
1902, sectoral shares based on market values, instead of nominal values, do not 
change the picture substantially. Yet, differences are non-negligible. 
Investors in our sample held more low-risk UK government bonds than the 
LSE figures in Table 7 would suggest, had they invested in sectors in proportion to 
market value. However, the standard deviation is very high, indicating substantial 
variation in risk preferences amongst UK investors. UK government bonds were the 
mainstay of trustee portfolios and considered relatively risk free. They were also in 
short supply,33 representing only 12.0 % by value of the LSE official list compared 
with 18.8% by value of our sample of portfolios combined. Our investors also held 
more colonial government stock by value than their importance on the LSE official 
list suggested. The most striking difference between Tables 6 and 7 is in the 
importance of non-domestic non-colonial government securities, which in our sample 
is significantly lower than the LSE market value numbers. On average, 4.8% of the 
total financial wealth of our sample was invested in foreign government stock, 
corresponding to an average of 5.4% per portfolio, although with a high variance 
across investors. These figures are significantly different from the LSE market value 
weighting which averaged 31.9% over the period. There are a number of possible 
reasons why investors did not put nearly one third of their financial investment into 
foreign bonds. First, such bonds, although listed on the LSE, were also sold to 
overseas investors as well as UK investors. Second, foreign bonds traded at a greater 
discount to par value than did UK government or colonial bonds (as shown in online 
Appendix Table A2). Given risk aversion, UK investors might prefer to subscribe for 
                                                          
33 The amount of UK government stock in issue fell from the peak of the Napoleonic Wars to the end 
of the nineteenth century. 
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and hold UK and empire government securities, which were consistently trading 
around par, rather than exposing themselves to the risks inherent in the significant 
market discount to par of foreign government stock. For example, Spanish 4 per cents 
fell from 70 to 48 between 1895 and 1898.34 More generally, investors were probably 
less inclined to hold non-UK government securities35 than other institutional 
investors, despite the relatively higher real returns (Edelstein 1982). 
At the same time, while the unweighted average percentage of domestic 
railways in the individual portfolios in our sample (Table 6) is in line with the UK 
railway market share in the LSE official list of 16.6%, there is a huge variation across 
individual portfolios, as evidenced by a very different weighted average portfolio 
share for our investors of 28.9%. This difference can be explained by the fact that 
wealthy investors, in the top quarter of the gross wealth distribution, showed a higher 
preference for domestic railways than the rest.36 There is also a striking difference in 
foreign railway holdings between investors in our sample (5.0%) and LSE market 
value figures (14.9%). However, one key reason for this is that British investors were 
not alone in buying these securities. Many US railway stocks, for example, were listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange as, for example, those issued by Pennsylvania 
Railroad. 
Adopting Markowitz’s approach to determine the optimal percentages for UK 
and non-UK railway securities in a portfolio (using fifteen years of historical returns 
data to estimate risks, returns, and correlation coefficients), Mitchell et al. (2012) 
found that the optimal percentage in railway securities in a global portfolio for a UK 
investor was 29.3% between 1884-1886, peaked at 43.8% between 1887-1894, falling 
to 37.6% between 1895-1902 (Mitchell et al. 2012, p. 823). In our sample, we can see 
(Table 6) that railway shares peaked in the third sub-period but plummeted towards 
                                                          
34 See Lowenfeld (1909, p. 52) for a discussion of the risks of buying foreign government bonds. 
35 Colonial debt was less liquid but highly prized by banks (Chavaz and Flandreau 2015; Goodhart 
1972). Still, UK investors were relatively more willing to hold it than foreign debt. 
36 See online Appendix Table A3. This result is consistent with recommendations by commentators 
such as Lowenfeld. For wealthy investors with more than sufficient income, he recommended the 
safest securities, which he deemed to be railways, municipals, gas and waterworks companies. The 
higher the yield required, the more the investors should venture into riskier securities, such as 
preference shares, and possibly ordinary shares (provided no debt). But for those who were happy with 
a modest yield, railways and infrastructure securities were sufficient. For a more detailed categorisation 
of investors according to wealth and income and the specific investment strategies for each category, 
see Lowenfeld (1909, Ch. II). 
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the end of the century, when, domestic realized returns in the sector fell considerably 
(as opposed, for instance, to very high realized returns of world railways, mainly in 
the US and Latin America, see Edelstein 1982, p. 153). Thus, the railway share in 
overall investment in our sample shows a similar trend to the optimal railway 
exposure calculated by Mitchell et al., both in domestic and non-domestic securities. 
Investors in our sample included the highest amount in railways at the very time that 
it was optimal to do so according to the Markowitz model. Yet, from our sample, this 
might be due to wealthy investors’ preference for domestic railway securities and not 
to average investor behavior. 
Turning to financial sector securities, 11.5% of our sample’s portfolio wealth 
was invested in financial firms (comprising the financial, land and investment; 
investment trust; and financial sectors37) relative to 5.5% in the LSE. The average 
weight of financial firms in an individual portfolio was much larger for the whole 
period at 19.7%. The very high standard deviation indicates high variance in holdings 
of financial firm securities among Victorian investors. This high variance is explained 
by the fact that less wealthy investors in the first two quartiles of the gross wealth 
distribution showed a relatively greater preference for financial sector securities (see 
online Appendix Table A3). Those relying on a buy and hold strategy could also 
count on high capital gains in relation to par values: initial share subscribers would 
have seen their securities triple their value for banks and insurance companies (online 
Appendix Table A2). 
Infrastructure absorbed almost 10% of the sample’s portfolio investment and 
represented 14.0% of the average portfolio; these figures are higher than the 
corresponding LSE figure of 3.9%. Indeed, infrastructure has the highest individual 
sector average investment of 9.2% in our sample after UK government and UK 
railway securities. This cannot be explained by the real returns, which were on 
average lower than both (light and heavy) industry and finance (Edelstein 1982). 
Infrastructure securities were over-represented in provincial stock exchanges in 
relation to the LSE, hence their actual weight in the overall UK market was higher 
than for the LSE and probably closer to the number shown in Table 6. Provincial 
                                                          
37 Investment trusts were means of indirect diversification but their overall capitalization was 
negligible, being lower that 1% of total LSE capitalization in terms of nominal value in 1902. 
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stock exchanges listed numerous gas, water and electricity companies; shipping 
companies were a significant part of the Liverpool stock exchange list; and many 
foreign telegraph companies were listed on both the Liverpool and Manchester stock 
exchanges (Thomas 1973, p. 120-9). Differences between London-based and 
provincial investors as to the attractiveness and availability of infrastructure 
investments could be a factor in the very high variance between individual portfolios 
for this sector. 
With regard to the remaining aggregated economic sectors reported by the 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, the results in our sample in Table 6 are by and 
large comparable to the market value LSE figures. However, in all cases, there are 
significant differences among investor portfolios, as indicated by very high standard 
deviations. For instance, the average portfolio weight of light industry is considerably 
higher than the overall share invested in that sector, reflecting high variance among 
portfolios. The very large variances of portfolio weights for almost all the asset 
categories of Table 6 invite a multivariate regression analysis to capture the important 
intra-sector variation. 
 
 
Variation within Victorian portfolios 
 
This section analyses the intra-sectoral variation of portfolio choices on the basis of 
investor-level cross-sectional regression analysis. The regression results shown in 
Table 8 are based on the following equation: 
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In the first 2 specifications, we use as dependent variables Yi the two diversification 
proxies defined above: the number of portfolio holdings (model 1) and the sum of 
squared portfolio weights or SSPW (model 2). In the third specification, the non-
domestic portfolio weight is the dependent variable, while the final logit specification 
has as a dependent variable a dummy, which takes the value of one if the portfolio 
contains only corporate securities other than railways and is zero otherwise. The list 
of explanatory variables includes several investor characteristics Xj (age, gender, 
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marital status, gross wealth and London residency38) as well as some proxies for 
sophistication Zk (foreign dummy, industry concentration and investment trust 
dummy, in line with relevant studies) that are likely to reflect levels of investor 
financial sophistication (see Goetzmann and Kumar 2008, p. 453). Appendix Table 
A1 offers a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regressions of Table 8. 
 
[TABLE 8 NEAR HERE] 
 
 As column 1 in Table 8 shows, the number of portfolio holdings (a crude 
measure of diversification) is related to investor gender and gross wealth. As expected 
from the previous discussion, these regression results show that wealthy investors 
held more diversified portfolios. Male investors held on average more securities in 
their portfolios than did female investors. Neither London investors nor the urban 
geography of investors appears to affect diversification. With respect to investor 
characteristics, the wealth effect is the only one that survives in model (2) when we 
use the SSPW as dependent variable (according to its definition, the SSPW is inversely 
proportional to diversification, so the negative sign indicates the very same effect: 
wealth is positively related to diversified portfolios). This implies that gross wealth 
was the only decisive factor for balanced diversified portfolios (the gender dummy 
coefficient is not statistically significant in model 2). 
 As sophistication proxies we use a foreign dummy, which takes the value of 
one if the investor holds at least one non-domestic security in the portfolio; an 
investment trust dummy, which is set to one if an investor includes an investment trust 
in the portfolio (indirect diversification); and industry concentration, which has been 
designed to capture the industry tilt (see Goetzmann and Kumar 2008, p. 453; Fama 
and French 1997) and measures the largest industry weight in the investor's portfolio. 
The coefficients for all sophistication proxies are statistically significant in both 
specifications (1) and (2) at the 1% level and have the expected signs, except for the 
investment trust dummy in the first specification which is significant at the 10% level. 
Investors who were aware of the benefits of (international) diversification held more 
                                                          
38 In the period under consideration, investors showed a preference for securities from local firms and 
stock exchanges (Rutterford et al. 2011). 
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securities and more balanced portfolios. On the other hand, the negative sign of the 
industry concentration coefficient in model (1) indicates that investors with large 
stakes (relative to their portfolio wealth) in a particular firm were more likely to avoid 
naïve diversification, preferring to hold more concentrated portfolios. 
 In specification (3) we see that gross wealth is not related to the portion of 
portfolio wealth invested in overseas securities. However, we also see that residence 
does affect preference for overseas securities. London residents invested, on average, 
15.8% more in non-domestic securities, which means that investors outside London 
were more attracted by domestic (and probably local) securities.39 Gender also affects 
preference for overseas securities. Women had higher non-domestic portfolio weights 
than men, thus showing greater interest in overseas investments. Also, the higher the 
portfolio concentration, the lower the non-domestic portfolio weight: unbalanced and 
security-concentrated portfolios were associated with domestic firms. In the logit 
specification (4) of Table 8, we see that portfolios including only securities other than 
government stock and railways were held by less wealthy investors. Specification (4) 
also shows that, on average, men and investors outside London were more inclined to 
hold portfolios with only non-railway corporate securities. Overall, we could assert 
that less wealthy investors were more willing to take more risk (diversifying less and 
being more attracted by corporate securities) and investors outside London were 
relatively more attracted by local corporate listings. These findings are in line with 
those reported in Table 5. 
 
[TABLE 9 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Table 9 categorizes portfolios according to possible combinations of holdings 
in three broad asset categories: government, railways, and other corporate. The largest 
group of investors in Table 9, comprising 35% of the total sample (predominantly less 
wealthy investors and men), held mostly UK corporate securities other than railways. 
At the higher portfolio values, investors held a broader range of securities and 
diversified internationally. Female investors showed a relatively greater preference for 
                                                          
39 This is in line with the findings of local investment bias and informal relations of trust by 
Rutterford et al. (2017) and Franks et al. (2009). 
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portfolios consisting of only government stock and railway securities compared with 
men, perhaps because some portfolios were held as trusts, with women, especially 
widows, more likely to be the beneficiaries. Although trust portfolios could include 
securities not on the ‘permitted investments’ list if provided for in the trust deed, it is 
likely that many trust portfolios in this period confined themselves to certain UK and 
colonial government and railway bonds.  
Of the total of 507 portfolios, two thirds included corporate non-railway 
securities, and so could not have been trust portfolios limited to permitted investments 
in the Trustees’ Investment Acts. For men and women, the percentage of such 
portfolios was 72.6% and 59% respectively. However, we cannot say how many, if 
any, of the 507 portfolios were trust portfolios limited to permitted investments. The 
use of permitted, relatively safe investments held in trust was seen as a way of 
keeping risk to acceptable levels. In our sample, 18.5% of investors held only 
government bonds, and 11.6% only UK government bonds. This can be viewed as an 
alternative approach to risk reduction when compared with portfolio diversification. 
However, as mentioned above, the relatively large group who held only corporate 
non-railway securities were neither following recommendations for trust portfolios 
nor recommendations by contemporary commentators to spread risk across a broad 
range of sectors. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
From the 1870s, UK investors were encouraged by financial advisers to diversify their 
portfolios and split them equally between different holdings (1/N rule) taking into 
account the global market. Gradually, after the turn of the twentieth century, a more 
top-down approach (which included all regions of the world in the investment 
opportunity set and securities from each region in a portfolio) was developed to assist 
investors in seeking beneficial correlations in the context of global distribution of 
risks. This study is the first systematic attempt to analyze the diversification strategies 
of late Victorian investors in England and Wales drawing upon a sample of 507 actual 
portfolios at death from the period 1870-1902. 
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 Probate records in our sample are almost equally divided between male and 
female, reinforcing the importance of women investors in the Victorian era. Victorian 
investors, in the sample, on average held around half of their gross wealth in financial 
investments, holding between 4 and 5 securities in their portfolios. The number of 
holdings in the median portfolio was two, indicating poor diversification for the 
majority of investors. Almost 40% of investors held just one security, while almost 
80% held no more than 5 securities. However, in terms of the number of holdings, 
Victorian investors compare well with post-1960s US household financial behavior. 
Comparing the unweighted average portfolio in our sample with different LSE 
asset categories in (estimated) market values, there are some notable differences. For 
example, Victorian investors invested relatively less in foreign (non-colonial) 
government securities and relatively more in domestic railways (particularly the case 
for wealthier investors). The (unweighted) average portfolio weights invested in 
financial firms, light industry and infrastructure were high at 19.7%, 10.2% and 
14.0% respectively, a total of 34.9%. However, there were substantial differences 
between investor portfolios, so that the total portfolio investment flowing to these 
three sectors, as measured by the weighted average of the portfolios, was actually 
much lower at the level of 23.7%. It seems that less wealthy Victorian investors were 
more open to investment in provincial and LSE unofficial securities, the majority of 
which were domestic. 
 The recommendation to hold securities in equal portfolio weights was 
generally ignored by late Victorian investors, even by wealthy investors. As expected, 
diversification was related to gross wealth; men held on average more securities than 
did women, but both held equally unbalanced portfolios. Residents outside London 
and less wealthy investors were more willing to hold securities of domestic financial 
firms and industries other than railways. This probably indicates a local preference 
effect, which is in line with relevant research (Rutterford et al. 2017). It appears that 
less wealthy investors were more prepared to buy risky corporate securities, but as 
Rutterford et al. (2017) have pointed out, geographical proximity engendered trust or 
informal networks, which may have provided an alternative risk reduction strategy to 
the more conventional spreading of risk across uncorrelated securities. Indeed, a 
group comprising 35.1% of the total sample that mostly includes less wealthy male 
investors, invested almost exclusively in UK non-railway corporate securities. On the 
29 
 
other hand, female investors showed a relative preference for government stock and 
railway securities. At higher portfolio values, investors were more willing to follow 
contemporary advice, spreading risk across a number of securities (with 11% of 
portfolios having 11 or more securities) and diversifying internationally, with a focus 
on government securities and railways. However, the levels of international 
diversification were not as high as recommended, in 1907, by Lowenfeld. 
All in all, 57.8% of the Victorian investors in our sample held portfolios with 
no more than 2 holdings, a sign of poor diversification. It would appear that most UK 
investors left the application of sophisticated security selection rules to investment 
professionals, only partially adopting a global distribution of risks strategy. Small 
investors may also have been unable to diversify as much as they wished, given 
relatively high transaction costs for small size trades. Overall, investors did diversify 
their portfolios across domestic and overseas markets, but not to the extent 
recommended by contemporary advice. 
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Appendix Table A1. Variable definitions for regressions. 
 
Variables Description 
Decade 
Categorical variable equals 1 if died in the 1870s, 2 if 
died in the 1880s, 3 if died in the 1890s, and 4 if died 
in the 1900s. 
Investor characteristics  
Age Age at death. 
Gender dummy Dummy equals 1 if the investor is female. 
Married dummy Dummy equals 1 if the investor is married. 
Gross wealth (log) The logarithm of gross wealth. 
London resident dummy Dummy equals 1 if the investor lives in London. 
Urban geography 
Categorical variable according to the place of 
residence: Rural=1, Small Urban=2, Medium Urban=3, 
Large Urban=4, Very Large Urban=5, London=6. 
Sophistication proxies  
Foreign dummy 
Dummy equals 1 if the investor has at least one non 
UK security in the portfolio. 
Industry concentration The largest industry weight in the investor portfolio. 
Investment trust dummy 
Dummy equals 1 if the investor has at least one 
investment trust security in the portfolio. 
Dependent variables  
Number of holdings in the portfolio The number of different securities in the portfolio. 
Sum of squared portfolio weights See definition in the main text. 
Non-domestic portfolio weight (%) 
The value of non-domestic holdings as % of the 
portfolio value. 
Corporate (other than railways) dummy 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the portfolio contains only 
corporate securities other than railways. 
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Table 1. Investor Summary Statistics for the Probate Sample. 
Panel (a) Age at death 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
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Panel (b) Categories of female investors 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
 
Notes: Age at death is available for 457 of 507 investors. The marital status is not reported 
for men. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for gross wealth categories for the sample. 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
 
Note: All values are in £. Financial portfolios include all liquid securities other than cash: that 
is, both equity (ordinary and preferred shares) and debt (debentures or Consols). Cash is a 
proxy for general cash savings including any type of cash in the house, in the bank, in the 
office or anywhere else. The category monies and interest due to deceased includes different 
types of debt (i.e. rents, mortgages, bonds and bills, and book debts) and the related interest 
payments owed to investors at the time of death. The gross wealth is the gross estate. It 
includes: monies and interest due to deceased, real estate, portfolio (all financial securities), 
life assurance, cash and the sum of chattels (this one is not reported in the table). The net 
wealth is equal to gross wealth minus total liabilities. The latter comprises all debts (ordinary 
debts, mortgages and bonds and bills) and related interest payments owed by the deceased. 
  
37 
 
Table 3. How diversified were Victorian investors? 
 
Panel (a) Diversification measures. 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
 
 
Panel (b) Distribution of portfolios among different holding bands. 
 
* The breakdown of holding bands is slightly different in Blume and Friend (1975): 1, 2-4, 5-
9, over 10. 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
 
Notes: Carlos et al. (2015) use an “extremely loose definition of portfolio” aggregating across 
company-years and check whether an individual owned shares in more than one company at 
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any point in the period. This is not directly comparable to the definition of portfolio holdings 
in the other studies. Post-1960s US studies discuss household surveys or related data, while 
we have investors in our sample. Goetzmann’s and Kumar’s sample is from a major US 
discount brokerage house so: (i) not necessarily representative of the household sector, and 
(ii) does not necessarily contain the individual’s entire financial wealth. Victorian portfolios 
include fixed income securities while the post-1960 US portfolios do not include bonds. As 
already defined, SSPW is the sum of the squared portfolio weights. 
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Table 4. Concentration of portfolios in our sample by wealth decile. 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
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Table 5. Under-diversified portfolios with one or two holdings. 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
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Table 6. Composition of financial portfolios of our sample (% over time). 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
 
Notes: The sectors have been defined in line with Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) and Mitchell 
et al. (2012). In particular: finance includes banks and insurance; light industry includes 
textiles, food, drink, and retail stores; heavy industry includes iron, coal, steel, and heavy 
fabrication, mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, building and construction materials, 
and chemicals; infrastructure (social overhead) includes electricity, gas, water, canals and 
docs, shipping, telephone and telegraph, tramways and omnibuses. Foreign assets are non-
domestic non-colonial assets. UK government includes Consols (17% of total investment), 
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Nationals (2% of total investment) and those Municipals (3% of total investment) which 
could not be categorized in other economic sectors (such as, utilities, docks etc.). The column 
‘unweighted av.’ shows the unweighted average for the whole period. This is different from 
the 'weighted av.' which measures the portfolio investment share of each asset category as a 
whole. 
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Table 7. London Stock Exchange listed securities (paid-up capital as % of total in 
market values). 
 
* BM indices did not include investment trusts. The total nominal capitalization of the latter 
was very low in relation to overall LSE capitalization. 
Sources: Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and Bankers’ Magazine (our calculations). 
 
Notes: The data were collected from issues of the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 
(SEOI), which was systematically published only after 1881. Our calculations are based on 
BM indices reported in online Appendix Table A2, which are available only after 1884. For 
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definitions of different sectors see the notes to Table 6. Municipals have not been absorbed 
within government or relevant economic sectors as in Table 6. Their size is very small in 
relation to the other asset categories so the comparison between Tables 6 and 7 is not affected. 
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Table 8. Investor level cross sectional regressions. 
 
* = significant at the 10% level. 
** = significant at the 5% level. 
*** = significant at the 1% level. 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets for the OLS specifications. Standard 
errors are reported for the logit specification. A full list of the variables can be found in the 
Appendix Table A1. The age is available for only 448 investors out of 507 in our sample. The 
above regression results do not change if we exclude age and run the same regressions for the 
507 portfolios.  
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Table 9. Portfolio diversification in relation to broad asset categories. 
 
Source: Probate sample, see the text. 
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Notes: The three left-hand columns describe all the possible permutations of three different 
broad security categories, with a 0 representing no holdings of each category and a 1 
representing some holdings. The last column indicates the percentage of financial investment 
in UK securities. Government includes all domestic and non-domestic government securities 
along with those municipal securities which could not be grouped into other corporate 
category. 
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Online Appendix 
 
 
1884-1886 1887-1894 1895-1902
Unweighted 
average
UK government 1.012 1.010 1.044 1.024
Empire government 0.997 1.047 1.065 1.044
Foreign government 0.825 0.848 0.881 0.857
UK corporation stocks 1.032 1.101 1.143 1.104
Non-UK corporation stocks 1.189 1.124 1.048 1.107
UK railways 1.207 1.361 1.359 1.329
Empire railways 0.905 0.965 0.984 0.961
Foreign railways 0.846 0.859 0.866 0.859
Finance 3.200 3.398 3.798 3.519
Financial, land and investment 1.110 1.132 1.225 1.165
Investment trusts − − − −
Light industry 1.197 1.430 2.981 2.004
Heavy industry 0.896 0.896 1.653 1.199
Extraction 1.127 1.165 5.232 2.784
Infrastructure 1.559 1.676 1.989 1.778
Tea (agriculture) 1.231 1.303 − 1.245
All 0.987 1.026 1.097 1.047
Table A2. Market value indices (market value divided by nominal value) for several sectors of 
the London Stock Exchange based on the Bankers’ Magazine  sample.
Source : The Bankers’ Magazine , several issues.
Notes: In 1887 the Bankers’ Magazine  started reporting monthly the market values of the 
main LSE sectors based on a sample of 338 LSE listed securities representing at that point about 
50% of its total capitalization in nominal values. This sample stayed almost the same with very 
minor changes up to World War I. By the year 1902, the final year in our dataset, the BM 
sample contained 325 LSE-listed securities representing about the one third of the overall LSE 
capitalization in terms of nominal values. The securities were carefully selected by the experts of 
the magazine and we could assume that they offer a representative picture of the trends in LSE 
market values. More information about the origin of BM indices can be found in Ellis (1888), 
from where the pre-1887 figures have been taken (the years 1881-1883 are missing). Many 
studies have used the BM indices before, most notably Morgan (1952), Goodhart (1972), and 
Hannah (2015).
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I II III IV top 10% top 5% Total
Average number of holdings 1.5 2.3 3.6 10.9 14.0 19.4 4.6
Median number of holdings 1.0 2.0 2.0 8.0 9.0 14.5 2.0
Average SSPW 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7
UK government 24.8 21.5 25.7 17.8 19.6 17.0 18.8
Empire government 9.2 6.9 13.7 6.9 7.1 7.9 7.6
Foreign government 2.7 6.3 7.6 4.4 3.9 4.7 4.8
Total government 36.7 34.7 47.1 29.2 30.5 29.6 31.2
UK municipals 0.9 0.1 2.3 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.4
Non-UK municipals 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK railways 12.0 16.4 15.1 31.2 31.5 34.4 28.9
Empire railways 3.8 5.9 5.7 4.2 3.4 3.4 4.4
Foreign railways 3.0 1.5 5.1 5.2 4.9 5.2 5.0
Total railways 18.8 23.9 25.9 40.6 39.8 43.0 38.4
Finance 19.5 14.7 7.5 6.9 7.4 5.7 7.4
Financial, land and investment 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.7 4.5 3.4 3.4
Investment trusts 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7
Total finance 22.3 17.0 10.1 11.4 12.3 9.7 11.5
Light industry 4.2 5.6 4.0 2.8 2.4 3.1 3.0
Heavy industry 1.6 4.1 0.9 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.6
Extraction 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.4 1.8 2.4 1.3
Infrastructure 14.3 13.4 8.8 9.0 7.8 6.4 9.2
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total other corporate 21.1 23.9 14.5 14.9 13.6 14.0 15.2
Unspecified 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total (£ million) 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.3 1.7 1.2 2.7
Notes: For the definitions of the different asset categories see notes of Table 6 in the main text. Foreign 
assets are non-domestic non-colonial assets. The columns report weighted average percentages, that is, % of 
total investment per wealth band.
Gross wealth quartile
Diversification measures
Sectoral composition (%)
Table A3. Diversification indices and cross-sectional distribution of assets (%) by gross wealth quartile.
Source : Probate sample, see the text.
